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The Role of (Dis)similarity in (Mis)predicting Others’ Preferences 
  
ABSTRACT  
Consumers readily indicate liking options that appear dissimilar—for example, enjoying both 
rustic lake vacations and chic city vacations, or liking both scholarly documentary films and 
action-packed thrillers. However, when predicting other consumers’ tastes for the same items, 
people believe that a preference for one precludes enjoyment of the dissimilar other. Five studies 
show that people sensibly expect others to like similar products, but erroneously expect others to 
dislike dissimilar ones (Studies 1 and 2). While people readily select dissimilar items for 
themselves (particularly if the dissimilar item is of higher quality than a similar one), they fail to 
predict this choice for others (Studies 3 and 4)—even when monetary rewards are at stake (Study 
3). The tendency to infer dislike from dissimilarity is driven by a belief that others have a narrow 
and homogeneous range of preferences (Study 5). 
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Suppose you encounter a consumer who is choosing between two products, Widget A 
and Widget B. After considering both options, the consumer decides on Widget A. Knowing of 
this choice, what would you predict about the consumer’s preferences for forgone Widget B? 
Choices reveal information about people’s preferences—both for options that are chosen, 
as well as those that are forgone. When we observe others make a choice, we consistently 
assume they like the option they chose (Miller and Nelson 2002), but make more nuanced 
inferences about their preferences for unchosen options. As this paper demonstrates, people 
make different predictions about a forgone option depending on whether it is similar—or 
dissimilar—to a chosen option; simply put, people expect others to like similar options and to 
dislike dissimilar ones. Consequently, Widget B will be perceived as a well-liked substitute when 
it is relatively similar to Widget A, but believed to be disliked and actively rejected when it is 
relatively dissimilar to Widget A.  
However, as we show, this intuition is often incorrect because it fails to account for the 
range and diversity of others’ preferences: people predict others dislike dissimilar options despite 
recognizing that they, themselves, simultaneously like dissimilar things. For example, people 
readily indicate enjoying dissimilar vacation destinations (e.g., lake and city) and dissimilar 
movies (e.g., documentaries and thrillers), but predict that—for others—a preference for one 
precludes enjoyment of the other. 
Five experiments demonstrate that people sensibly expect others to like similar products, 
but erroneously expect others to dislike dissimilar ones (Studies 1 and 2). While people readily 
select dissimilar items for themselves (particularly if the dissimilar item is of higher quality than 
a similar one), they fail to predict this choice for others (Studies 3 and 4)—even when monetary 
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rewards are at stake (Study 3). We show that the tendency to infer dislike from dissimilarity is 
driven by a belief that others have a narrow and homogeneous range of preferences (Study 5). 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Predicting Others’ Preferences 
The ability to accurately predict others’ preferences is important across a number of 
contexts. We predict others’ preferences when we buy gifts or make joint household decisions. 
Agents, such as realtors and money managers, are tasked with curating choice sets based on their 
clients’ implicit and explicit desires. In times of medical crisis, physicians and next-of-kin are 
called on to make life-or-death decisions based on what they infer the patient’s preferences to be. 
And of course, predicting customers’ tastes is an essential marketing task: whether it is selecting 
the right merchandise to stock or promotions to run, businesses face the perennial task of making 
accurate predictions about their clientele.  
Very often, such predictions must be made with little or no explicit information about 
others’ actual preferences, leaving people to rely on previously observed behaviors: how has the 
other person chosen in the past? Consequently, previous choice information becomes influential 
in preference prediction. Therefore, when faced with the above question—“what would you 
predict about the consumer’s preferences for Widget B?”—we suggest that people engage in a 
discernible evaluative process, such that they: 1) attend to available information about the 
consumer’s related choices (in this case, to the consumer’s selection of Widget A); 2) evaluate 
the relative similarity of Widgets A and B; and 3) conclude that Widget B is liked if similar, but 
disliked if dissimilar (Figure 1).  
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
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To elucidate, consider the first node in this evaluative process: observing a target’s choice 
of Widget A. People readily observe one another’s choices—the cars they drive, the food they 
eat, the clothes they wear—and unfailingly conclude that others like the options they choose: if a 
consumer chooses Widget A, the consumer must like Widget A. This intuition is robust and 
unyielding, and persists even when the chosen option is objectively undesirable (e.g., Jones and 
Harris 1967; Miller and Nelson 2002). In essence, observers use others’ known choices as 
meaningful benchmarks against which unchosen options are compared.  
This observation of choice is a necessary precondition for the proposed evaluative 
process; it provides a focal item against which to compare unchosen options. Without knowing 
that Widget A was chosen, observers would have no reason to use similarity as a basis for their 
predictions, and may simply project their own preferences (i.e., “I like Widget B; I predict he 
will like Widget B”), or evaluate Widget B on its own merits (i.e., “Widget B is good; I predict 
he will like Widget B”). However, we suggest that a known choice triggers the process outlined 
in Figure 1, such that people evaluate Widget B by comparing it to Widget A. Consequently, 
even if observers would find Widget B appealing and likeable in its own right—and would, in 
isolation, predict that it is liked—the known choice of Widget A can significantly sway their 
predictions. 
Central to our account, this comparison process—outlined in the second and third nodes 
of Figure 1—systematically shapes the specific predictions people make about others’ 
preferences. Research has shown that when making comparative judgments, the starting point—
or “subject”—of the comparison carries special weight (Houston, Sherman and Baker 1989); 
people evaluate new options relative to the subject (or, in our model, to the known choice of 
Widget A) and pay particular attention to which attributes the new option lacks or shares. 
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Therefore, the chosen option’s features become a kind of de facto checklist; people note which 
attributes Widget B has in common with Widget A, and base their evaluations of Widget B on 
the degree of overlapping features (Houston and Sherman 1995; Houston, Sherman and Baker 
1989).  
These overlapping or common features also affect perceived (dis)similarity; items appear 
more similar as a function of their shared features, and less similar as a function of their 
distinctive or unique features (Tversky 1977). Therefore, with respect to observers’ predictions, 
an unchosen option that shares many features—and thus possesses many of the attributes on the 
desired “checklist”—will be perceived as similar and presumed to be liked, while an unchosen 
option that shares few features will be perceived as dissimilar and presumed to be disliked. 
The surprising aspect of these hypotheses is not that people expect others to like similar 
items (Lefkoff-Hagius and Mason 1993); indeed, this appears to be a sensible and correct 
inference (Linden, Smith, and York 2003). The more interesting question is: why do people 
predict that others must dislike dissimilar items? Even if a dissimilar option lacks attributes on 
the known choice’s “checklist”—and therefore does not possess the qualities people assume 
others value—it may still have features that are objectively desirable. But, as we argue, 
dissimilar items are not simply seen as neutral alternatives; people instead predict that they are 
actively rejected and disliked. Therefore, we suggest a more fundamental misperception drives 
this inference of active dislike: a tendency to underestimate the range and diversity of other 
people’s tastes. In other words, people believe others’ preferences to be more homogeneous or 
one-dimensional than they, in fact, are. 
Researchers have documented a related tendency among groups, such that people infer 
out-group members are more alike than members of in-groups (e.g., Judd, Ryan and Park 1991; 
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Linville, Fischer, and Salovey 1989; Park and Hastie 1987; Park and Judd 1990; Quattrone and 
Jones 1980). As a result of this phenomenon, the “out-group homogeneity effect,” people 
perceive members of an out-group to lack interpersonal diversity and be “tightly bunched around 
the group central tendency” (Judd et al. 1991, p. 367). As an example, a woman might believe 
that “all men are alike” and, correspondingly, believe that “all men are very adventurous”—or 
that men are narrowly distributed or “tightly bunched” around the trait of adventurousness 
(Rubin and Badea 2012).  
Where out-group homogeneity research has shown that people see out-groups as more 
interpersonally homogeneous (e.g., “all men are alike”), we suggest people also perceive other 
individuals are more intrapersonally homogeneous (e.g., “all of that person’s preferences are 
alike”). Particularly once a target’s choice is known, people (mistakenly) believe all of the other 
person’s preferences to be narrowly clustered around that single choice. For example, if an 
observer learns that someone chose to vacation at a lake destination, he may infer that person 
only likes outdoorsy vacations. We argue that this inference of homogeneity, in turn, drives the 
inference of dislike: narrower ranges of preferences mean that more items fall outside the realm 
of “what is liked,” and thus have a higher probability of being disliked.  
Although research has documented the persistent belief that out-group members are 
overly similar, it does not purport that this belief is always mistaken or erroneous (Judd et al. 
1991). In the same vein, our investigation looks at the persistent belief that others’ preferences 
are similar and narrow; we do not suggest that the belief is always incorrect. Undoubtedly, there 
are situations in which dissimilar may actually be indicative of dislike—for instance, someone 
who chose an environmentally-friendly Prius may actually hate gas-guzzling Hummers—but we 
document instances in which this belief is both wrong and costly (Studies 3 and 4). 
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Similarity and Stimuli Selection 
Because perceived (dis)similarity is central to our investigation, it is critical to articulate 
what qualifies as “similar” or “dissimilar.” Tversky (1977) proposed that similarity is a function 
of the features that are shared by two objects, and the features that are unique to one but not the 
other. Since then, a vast body of subsequent research—spanning cognitive, social, and consumer 
psychology—has highlighted the ways in which similarity judgments can be more complex and 
malleable (for a review, see Medin, Goldstone and Gentner 1993); for example, similarity may 
vary as a function of context and option set (Dhar and Glazer 1996; Tversky and Gati 1982), 
time horizon (Day and Bartels 2008), characteristics and attributes considered (Houston and 
Sherman 1995; Lefkoff-Hagius and Mason 1993), and mode of comparison (Dhar, Nowlis and 
Sherman 1999; Houston, Sherman and Baker 1989).  
Taking these complexities into account, we carefully selected our experimental stimuli to 
represent similar and dissimilar options. We used the methodology employed by past research on 
similarity (e.g., Boldry, Gaertner and Quinn 2007; Dhar and Glazer 1996; Lefkoff-Hagius and 
Mason 1993) and pretested our stimuli to gather global assessments of similarity (e.g., “On a 
scale from 1 to 7, how similar do you think these two items are?”). In addition, we directly 
manipulated the perceived similarity of two imaginary products (Study 2) based on Tverksy’s 
(1977) feature-matching definition, ensuring that our results were causally related to perceived 
similarity, and not merely an artifact of the specific stimuli we chose.  
 
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
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Five studies document when and why people infer dislike from dissimilarity. Studies 1 
and 2 show the basic effect, demonstrating that people make predictions based on (dis)similarity. 
Studies 3 and 4 document the error in these predictions by showing that people do indeed enjoy 
dissimilar options for themselves—and readily choose dissimilar items that are of higher 
quality—but fail to predict that others do, too. Finally, Study 5 provides evidence of the 
explanation underlying the prediction error: the tendency to infer dislike from dissimilarity is 
driven by the belief that others have a narrow and homogeneous range of preferences. 
Across the five studies, we measured our dependent variable in three different—but 
complementary—ways to ensure the robustness of our results. We asked participants to make 
predictions about whether a target dislikes/is neutral about/likes a given option (Studies 1 and 2), 
how a target would rate an option on a 7-point Likert scale (Studies 2, 3, and 5), and how a target 
would choose between two options (Studies 3 and 4). Further, we asked participants to make 
these predictions about options that were forgone both explicitly (e.g., consumer was deciding 
between Widget A and B and chose A; make a prediction about Widget B) and implicitly (e.g., 
consumer chose Widget A; make a prediction about Widget B). Regardless of how the question 
was posed, and irrespective of whether the option was explicitly or implicitly forgone, the studies 
provide converging evidence that people infer others must dislike dissimilar things. 
 
STUDY 1 
By our account, when predicting someone’s preferences for unchosen Widget B, 
observers evaluate how similar Widget B is to chosen Widget A, and predict that Widget B is 
liked if similar and disliked if dissimilar (Figure 1). As discussed above, one necessary 
precondition is that a target’s previous choice is known—for instance, that observers know the 
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target selected Widget A—such that there is a focal item against which to compare unchosen 
options. In other words, without knowing Widget A had been chosen, observers will have no 
reason to use similarity as a basis for their predictions, and may predict that both Widget A and 
B are liked—even if they are dissimilar. 
Study 1 demonstrated this dynamic by comparing a condition in which a target’s previous 
choice was known to a condition in which a target’s previous choice was unknown. We used a 
real-world forum for the sharing and observing of people’s choices—Facebook status updates—
and showed participants a post from a hypothetical friend, Joe Smith. All participants had to 
predict whether Joe liked or disliked two unchosen vacation options (city and mountains); in one 
condition, participants had no information about Joe’s vacation preferences, while in another, 
participants learned that Joe had previously chosen to vacation at a lake. We examined how 
participants’ predictions of Joe’s preferences changed as a function of both (dis)similarity, and 
whether or not the previous vacation choice was known.  
  
Procedure 
Pretest. The stimuli in Study 1 were three vacation destinations: lake, mountains, and 
city. In the known choice condition, Joe Smith selected the lake; therefore, we selected 
mountains and city to appear similar and dissimilar, respectively, to that known choice. In a 
pretest on Mechanical Turk (N = 89), we asked participants to rate the extent to which different 
vacation options were similar to each other (1 = not at all similar to 7 = very similar). The 
results confirmed that lake and mountains were perceived as significantly more similar (M = 
3.31, SD = 1.72) than lake and city (M = 1.69, SD = .98; t(88) = 8.73, p < .001).  
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Design. Study 1 was a two-condition, between-subjects design. Online participants (N = 
205, 59% male; Mage = 31.1, SD = 10.0) were either given (known choice condition) or not given 
(unknown choice condition) information on another person’s vacation choice. To start, all 
participants saw the Facebook status update of a hypothetical friend, Joe Smith. In the unknown 
choice condition, the status update simply read: “Just booked a vacation!” In the known choice 
condition, the status update read: “Just booked a vacation! Headed to a lake.” 
Prediction task. All participants predicted Joe Smith’s preferences for two additional 
vacation destinations: mountain (similar) and city (dissimilar). Participants indicated their 
prediction by completing two sentences, “Joe ___ city vacations” and “Joe ___ mountain 
vacations,” with one of three options: dislikes, is neutral about, or likes.  
This and all subsequent experiments concluded with basic demographic questions. We set 
the desired number of participants at the outset of the experiment, targeting recruitment of at 
least 100 participants per cell; for our lab sessions, slightly fewer participants showed up than 
were expected. We did not analyze the data until the final number of participants was reached. 
No data were excluded and we report all measures and conditions. All stimuli are included in the 
web appendix.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 Prediction task. The known choice—“Headed to a lake”—had a significant effect on 
participants’ predictions (Figure 2). We conducted a repeated measures logistic regression using 
prediction as the dependent measure; because we were most interested in the propensity to 
predict “dislike,” we dummy coded predictions as 1 = dislike and 0 = neutral or like. There was 
no main effect of condition (B = -2.26, SE = 4.53, p = NS), but there was a main effect of 
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destination (B = -6.93, SE = 1.44, p < .001), and importantly, also a significant interaction (B = 
4.52, SE = 1.71, p = .008). Follow-up tests revealed that when people predicted Joe’s preferences 
for the similar destination, mountain, “dislike” predictions did not differ as a function of 
condition (B = -.01, SE = .93, p = NS); in both conditions, only 2.9% of participants predicted 
that Joe dislikes mountains. However, when predicting Joe’s preferences for the dissimilar 
destination, city, people were significantly more likely to predict “dislike” when they knew about 
Joe’s previous choice of lake (B = 1.51, SE = .39, p < .001); at baseline, only 9.8% of 
participants predicted that Joe dislikes cities, but 33.0% predicted that Joe dislikes cities upon 
learning of his dissimilar choice of lake.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
Study 1 provides evidence that observers infer that—relative to a known choice—similar 
options are liked, while dissimilar options are disliked. In addition, the results also show that 
observers make significantly different predictions about others’ preferences when a previous 
choice in that category is known. As a result, an option—like the city vacation—may appear 
perfectly likeable in one context (unknown choice) but unlikeable in another (known choice). 
This supports our account that a target’s known choice is a necessary precondition for this 
inferential process, and demonstrates that observers form their predictions about unchosen 
options relative to known choices. (Having established this point, our remaining studies examine 
observers’ predictions when previous choices are always known.)  
 
STUDY 2 
Study 2 replicated and extended Study 1 in two key ways. First, we ruled out the 
possibility that the effect was merely an artifact of the vacation stimuli employed in Study 1. To 
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do so, we employed imaginary products, Widget A and Widget B, and directly manipulated their 
perceived similarity based on Tversky’s (1977) feature-matching definition of similarity. Second, 
we included additional dependent measures to provide converging evidence of the effect. 
 
Procedure 
Design. Study 2 was a two-condition, between-subjects design. Online participants (N = 
297, 67% male; Mage = 30.7, SD = 9.7) read a scenario about a consumer, Jane, who was 
choosing between two products. In one condition, the two products were framed to appear 
relatively similar (similar condition); in the other condition, they were framed to appear 
relatively dissimilar (dissimilar condition). 
All participants encountered the same basic scenario: “Suppose that Jane is choosing 
between two different products, Widget A and Widget B. Both Widgets can be described by 5 
key attributes: price, size, shape, function, and quality.” In the similar condition, participants 
learned: “Widget A and Widget B share 4 of 5 attributes. In other words, they have 4 attributes in 
common.” In the dissimilar condition, participants learned: “Widget A and Widget B share 1 of 5 
attributes. In other words, they have 1 attribute in common.” In both conditions, participants 
were informed of Jane’s choice: “Jane chooses Widget A.”  
Prediction task. Participants made three predictions about Jane’s attitudes toward Widget 
B, the forgone option. First, participants predicted how much Jane likes or dislikes Widget B on 
a 7-point Likert scale (1 = does not like at all to 7 = likes very much). Next, as in Study 1, 
participants completed the sentence, “Jane ___ Widget B,” by selecting one of three options: 
dislikes, is neutral about, or likes. Last, participants estimated how likely Jane would be to buy 
Widget B if Widget A were no longer available (1 = not at all likely to 7 = very likely). 
 14 
Manipulation check. At the end of the survey, participants assessed the perceived 
(dis)similarity of Widgets A and B (1 = very dissimilar to 7 = very similar). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation check. As intended, participants perceived Widgets A and B to be less 
similar in the dissimilar condition (M = 2.88, SD = 1.47) than in the similar condition (M = 5.82, 
SD = 0.80; t(295) = 21.44, p < .001). 
Prediction task. While Widget B was forgone in both conditions—rejected by Jane in 
favor of Widget A—participants made different predictions about Jane’s preferences depending 
on Widget B’s perceived (dis)similarity to Widget A. For the first measure, participants in the 
dissimilar condition predicted Jane liked Widget B significantly less (M = 3.25, SD = 1.23) than 
participants in the similar condition (M = 4.70, SD = 1.17; t(295) = 10.37, p < .001).  
For the second measure, participants predicted whether Jane dislikes, is neutral about, or 
likes Widget B. The overall chi-square test revealed a significant main effect of condition on 
preference prediction (χ2(2) = 78.492, p < .001; Figure 3). Most participants in the dissimilar 
condition (61.5%) predicted that Jane dislikes Widget B; in contrast, few (14.8%) participants in 
the similar condition predicted that Jane dislikes Widget B (χ2(1) = 68.76, p < .001).  
Finally, when asked to imagine that Widget A was unavailable, participants in the 
dissimilar condition thought Jane would be less likely to buy Widget B (M = 4.11, SD = 1.57) 
than participants in the similar condition (M = 5.81, SD = 1.04; t(295) = 11.02, p < .001), 
suggesting that different beliefs about Jane’s preferences also translated into different beliefs 
about Jane’s future behavior. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3] 
 15 
All participants were given the same information about Jane’s preferences: she had 
selected Widget A over Widget B. However, as expected, participants made significantly 
different judgments about forgone Widget B depending on its relationship to chosen Widget A. 
Therefore, Study 2 makes two key contributions. First, it rules out the possibility that Study 1’s 
results were simply an artifact of the specific stimuli we used, instead showing that the effect 
emerges even in a minimalist setting using a clean and crisp manipulation of similarity. Second, 
by documenting the effect using three different dependent measures—the sentence completion 
task from Study 1, a scale measure of liking, and a prediction of future behavior—Study 2 
provides converging evidence that people use dissimilarity to predict dislike.  
So far, we have shown that observers make different predictions when they know (versus 
do not know) what someone else previously chose (Study 1), and more importantly, that they 
evaluate new options based on the relative (dis)similarity to that known choice (Studies 1 and 2). 
In Studies 3 and 4, we tested whether these inferences are accurate. 
 
STUDY 3  
Studies 3 and 4 tested the accuracy and strength of the belief that others dislike dissimilar 
things. To test the accuracy of this belief, both studies collected both actual and predicted 
preferences: participants either indicated their own preference (self condition), or—as in Studies 
1 and 2—predicted someone else’s preference (observer condition). Comparing actual and 
predicted preferences provided a measure of accuracy. 
To test the strength of this belief, both studies asked participants to make a trade-off 
between similarity and quality. Specifically, participants had to choose (either for themselves or 
someone else) between a three-star movie in a preferred genre and a five-star movie in a 
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dissimilar genre. In addition, Study 3 also used an incentive compatible design with a monetary 
bonus awarded for predictive accuracy. We anticipated that participants would choose the higher 
rated but dissimilar movie for themselves, but—despite the quality trade-off and monetary 
incentive—would predict others to make the opposite choice.  
 
Procedure  
Design. Study 3 was a two-condition, between-subjects design. Lab participants (N = 
178; 52% male; Mage = 22.6, SD = 3.8) completed a study at a northeastern U.S. university lab in 
exchange for $20 and the possibility to earn a $2 bonus. Upon entering the lab, participants were 
randomly placed in dyads; one partner in the dyad reported his/her own preferences (self), while 
the other predicted his/her partner’s preferences (observer). Dyads were seated on opposite sides 
of the room and remained anonymous to one another; their only interaction was through paper 
exchange via an experimenter.  
Establishing a known choice. To begin, participants in the self condition indicated on a 
piece of paper which of two movies—a five-star thriller and a five-star documentary—they 
would prefer to watch. An experimenter collected the papers and delivered them to the partners 
who had been assigned the role of observer. Thus observers saw both the question and how their 
partner had answered. Both participants in the dyad also entered the preferred movie choice into 
the computer. 
Ratings task. Next, we measured participants’ actual and predicted ratings. All 
participants provided ratings of both genres (thrillers and documentaries) on a 7-point Likert 
scale (1 = not at all to 7 = very much). Specifically, participants in the self condition were asked: 
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“Generally speaking, how much do you like each genre?” Participants in the observer condition 
were asked: “Generally speaking, how much do you think your partner likes each genre?”  
Trade-off task. Next, both partners were presented with a trade-off choice task. 
Participants in the self condition were told: “Suppose that your first-choice movie is no longer 
available. Which movie would you select instead?” These participants had the option of a lower 
quality, three-star version of their preferred genre (as established in the known choice task) or a 
higher quality, five-star version of the unchosen, dissimilar option. Specifically, had a participant 
preferred thrillers, her trade-off choice would be between a three-star thriller and a five-star 
documentary; had the participant preferred documentaries, her trade-off choice would be 
between a three-star documentary and a five-star thriller. 
In the observer condition, each participant predicted his/her partner’s choice from the 
same two options (i.e., a three-star version of the preferred genre or a five-star version of the 
dissimilar, unchosen genre). Observers were told: “Suppose that your partner’s first-choice 
movie is no longer available. Making a decision on your partner’s behalf, which movie would 
you select instead?” In addition, they were told: “If your answer matches your partner’s 
selection, you will receive a $2 bonus upon checkout.”  
Preference strength task. As one final measure, participants in the self condition 
indicated how much they liked the two trade-off options (three-star version of preferred genre 
and five-star dissimilar option) after they had made their trade-off choice. These participants 
rated each option on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all to 7 = very much). This measure was 
designed to elucidate the magnitude of the prediction error, determining whether “mistaking 




Results and Discussion 
Ratings task. A 2 (between-subjects, role: self versus observer) x 2 (within-subjects, 
option: preferred versus dissimilar option) mixed ANOVA revealed two main effects. 
Unsurprisingly, regardless of role, the preferred option (as indicated in the known choice task) 
was rated significantly higher than the unchosen, dissimilar option (Mpreferred = 5.46, SE = .07; 
Mdissimilar = 3.47, SE = .10; F(1, 176) = 439.08, p < .001). There was also a main effect of role 
(Mself = 4.83, SE = .10; Mobserver = 4.10, SE = .10; F(1, 176) = 27.20, p < .001).  
Critically, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction (F(1, 176) = 
23.56, p < .001). Specifically, when rating the preferred option, the difference between self and 
observer ratings was small in magnitude and marginal in significance (Mself = 5.60, SD = 1.00; 
Mobserver = 5.33, SD = .89; t(176) = 1.91, p = .06). However, observers’ predicted ratings for the 
unchosen, dissimilar option were substantially and significantly lower than their partners’ actual 
ratings (Mobserver = 2.88, SD = 1.01; Mself = 4.07, SD = 1.51; t(176) = 6.18, p < .001). Assessed 
another way, self participants reported a smaller difference in ratings between their preferred and 
unchosen options (M = 1.53, SD = 1.37) than observer participants predicted (M = 2.45, SD = 
1.16; t(176) = -4.85, p < .001). In addition, observer ratings for the dissimilar option were 
significantly below the scale midpoint (t(88) = -10.50, p < .001), while self ratings were not 
(t(88) = .42, p = .68). 
[INSERT FIGURE 4] 
Trade-off task. All participants were asked to choose—either for themselves or on behalf 
of their partner—between a three-star version of the preferred genre and a five-star version of the 
dissimilar, unchosen genre. While most (68.5%) participants chose the higher quality, dissimilar 
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option for themselves, fewer than half (39.3%) of those in the observer condition predicted that 
choice (χ2(1) = 15.29, p < .001)—despite having been incentivized for accuracy. 
Preference strength task. Participants in the self condition not only selected the higher 
quality dissimilar option in the trade-off choice task; they also strongly preferred the higher 
quality, dissimilar option (M = 4.83, SD = 1.59) to the lower quality version of the preferred 
genre (M = 3.66, SD = 1.28; t(88) = 5.37, p < .001). Additionally, self participants rated the 
higher quality, dissimilar option significantly above the scale midpoint (t(88) = 4.93, p < .001), 
and the lower quality version of the preferred genre significantly below the scale midpoint (t(88) 
= -2.49, p = .02). This result suggests that the prediction error is considerable in magnitude:  
observers not only mispredicted their partners’ choices, but also predicted an option that was 
liked significantly less.  
Study 3 demonstrated that observers both misestimated others’ ratings and mispredicted 
others’ choices, believing both that dissimilar items were liked significantly less than they 
actually were, and predicting a rejection of the higher quality, dissimilar option in favor of a 
lower quality, similar option. Moreover, observers made this error despite being financially 
incented for accuracy. 
 
STUDY 4 
Study 4 tested the specificity of the error. As in Study 3, participants chose between two 
movies of varying quality; however, unique to Study 4, we used both a pair of dissimilar genres 
(i.e., thriller and documentary) and a pair of similar genres (i.e., thriller and action adventure). 
We expected participants to believe that others can like similar options, and thus predict others 
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would be willing to switch to a higher quality, similar genre. Critically, however, we anticipated 
that participants would fail to predict the switch when the alternative option was dissimilar. 
 
Procedure 
Pretest. Study 4 used a similar pair of movies (i.e., thriller and action adventure) and a 
dissimilar pair of movies (i.e., thriller and documentary). A separate pretest confirmed that 
thrillers and action adventures are perceived to be more similar (M = 4.45, SD = 1.46) than 
thrillers and documentaries (M = 2.03, SD = 1.28; p < .001). 
Design. Study 4 was a 2 (role: self versus observer) x 2 (option set: similar vs. dissimilar) 
between-subjects design. Online participants (N = 601; 64% male; Mage = 32.7, SD = 10.6) first 
encountered a known choice task followed by a prediction task. To manipulate role, we asked 
participants to either report their own preferences (self) or to predict someone else’s preferences 
(observer). To manipulate option set, we asked participants to either choose between two similar 
movie genres or two dissimilar movie genres. 
Establishing a known choice. Participants in the self condition indicated which of two 
movie genres they preferred (“In general, which movie genre do you prefer?”). Half of these 
participants (i.e., one-fourth of all participants) selected between two similar options, thriller and 
action adventure; the other half selected between two dissimilar options, thriller and 
documentary. To make the genres tangible, we included three well-known and contemporary 
examples of each (thriller examples: Gravity, Captain Phillips, Lone Survivor; action adventure 
examples: The Dark Knight, Terminator, Star Trek; documentary examples: Blackfish, Man on 
Wire, Inside Job.) 
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Participants in the observer condition were told which of the two genres someone else 
preferred. Specifically, observers read: “Study participant (Participant #62013) was asked the 
following question and provided the following answer.” (In reality, we randomly assigned 
participants to receive different information about Participant #62013’s preferences.) A 
screenshot of the survey question was displayed, and a radio button was filled in to indicate the 
previous respondent’s selection. Half of the observer participants saw Participant #62013’s 
selection between two similar options, thriller and action adventure (counterbalanced); the other 
half saw Participant #62013’s selection between two dissimilar options, thriller and documentary 
(counterbalanced). To ensure that participants had processed this information, observer 
participants were asked: “Which movie genre does Participant #62013 generally prefer?” They 
were not able to advance until they had correctly restated the choice. 
Trade-off choice. Next, participants faced a choice, either making it for themselves 
(“Which movie would you rather see?”) or predicting it for someone else (“Which movie do you 
think Participant #62013 would rather see?”). As in Study 3, participants chose between a three-
star version of the preferred genre (as established in the known choice task) and a five-star 
version of the alternative genre.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 Trade-off choice. A logistic regression revealed that the propensity to choose the higher 
quality movie depended on both role (B = 2.09, SE = .27, p < .001) and option set (B = 2.29, SE 
= .28, p < .001). More importantly, the predicted interaction between role and option set emerged 
(B = -1.86, SE = .37, p < .001, Figure 5). Follow-up tests revealed that when the option set 
consisted of similar movies (i.e., thriller and action adventure, left side of Figure 5), there was no 
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difference in actual and predicted choice (self = 73.5% vs. observer = 68.7%; χ2(1) = .86, p = 
.35), demonstrating that participants correctly predicted others’ trade-off choices among similar 
items. However, when the option set contained dissimilar movies (i.e., thriller and documentary), 
a significant prediction error emerged. While most people (64.2%) preferred the higher quality, 
dissimilar movie for themselves, most observers failed to predict this preference: only 18.1% 
correctly predicted that others would select the higher quality dissimilar movie (χ2(1) = 65.78, p 
< .001).  [INSERT FIGURE 5] 
While Study 3 documented the error in the prediction, Study 4 went further by 
demonstrating the specificity of the error: although people inaccurately predicted others’ choices 
between dissimilar options (i.e., thriller and documentaries), their predictions were accurate 
when the options were similar (i.e., thriller and action adventure). Having demonstrated that 




We propose that the tendency to infer dislike from dissimilarity is driven by a belief that 
others have a narrow and homogeneous range of preferences, and therefore must not like 
dissimilar options. We draw on research from out-group homogeneity to support this account: 
where out-group homogeneity research documents the belief that out-group members lack 
interpersonal variability (e.g., “all men are alike”), we suggest people also believe other 
individuals lack intrapersonal variability (e.g., “all of that person’s tastes are alike”). In turn, this 
perceived lack of variability drives people to think that others’ preferences are mutually 
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exclusive: if someone likes documentaries or lake vacations, he necessarily must not like 
dissimilar “opposites,” thrillers or city vacations. Narrower and less variable preferences mean 
that more items fall outside the realm of “what is liked,” and have a higher probability of being 
disliked. 
To test this account, Study 5 measured individuals’ beliefs that others have homogeneous 
preferences using a distribution task akin to those used in out-group homogeneity research 
(Boldry, Gaertner and Quinn 2007; Judd et al. 1991; Linville et al. 1998; Park and Hastie 1987; 
Park and Judd 1990). As an example, Park and Hastie (1987) asked participants, “How many of 
these 100 [out-group] members would fall into each of eight boxes, which represent a continuum 
of the trait dimension intelligence,” where the boxes on the far left and right were labeled 
“stupid” and “intelligent,” respectively; smaller ranges and tighter distributions reveal 
perceptions of homogeneity. We adapted this approach to directly measure participants’ beliefs 
about the distribution of others’ preferences in a particular domain: we asked participants to 
estimate the distribution of an average consumer’s music preferences across multiple genres. 
Narrower distributions indicated a belief that others’ preferences are homogeneous and one-
dimensional, while broader distributions indicated a belief that others’ tastes are more diverse 
and varied. 
Anticipating variability in the strength of this belief, we then examined the role of the 
measured belief in how people make predictions. We replicated the basic design of Study 1, in 
which participants predicted how much a target likes a mountain and city destination after 
learning of his/her choice of a lake vacation. We expected that people who strongly believe 
others have homogeneous tastes would be more likely to predict that a dissimilar option is 
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disliked. Inversely, we anticipated that for people who believe others have diverse tastes, the 
effect would be mitigated and dissimilar options would be judged more favorably.  
 
Procedure 
Design. Study 5 was a two-condition, within-subjects design manipulating option (similar 
versus dissimilar). A second factor, belief in preference homogeneity, served as a measured 
independent variable. Online participants (N = 196; 59% male; Mage = 34.3, SD = 11.6) were all 
asked to take an observer role and make predictions about someone else’s preferences. 
Measuring the belief. To begin, all participants read the following: “Imagine that an 
average U.S. consumer was asked to indicate his/her music preferences by telling us how many 
songs from each music genre he/she would put in a 5-song playlist. We have disguised the 
specific music genres, but imagine the options included 5 very different kinds of music: 
Alternative Rock, Top 40 Pop, Classical, American Folk, and Hip Hop. How many songs do you 
think he/she would select from each genre?” Below the question, participants saw 5 textboxes 
with “Genre 1” through “Genre 5” labeled next to each; participants specified the number of 
songs from each genre, summing to five total songs. The distribution indicated participants’ 
beliefs about others’ preference homogeneity; for example, a distribution of [0, 5, 0, 0, 0] 
indicated a strong belief about another person’s preference homogeneity (i.e., tightly clustered 
and unvaried tastes), while a distribution of [1, 1, 1, 1, 1], indicated a weak belief in preference 
homogeneity (i.e., dispersed and varied tastes). 
Prediction task. On the following screen, participants were informed that they would next 
be asked to make predictions about a different person’s vacation preferences. Rather than 
predicting for an average U.S. consumer, participants now made predictions for a “previous 
 25 
survey respondent.” (In reality, we created the answer this respondent had supposedly provided.) 
All participants read: “In a previous survey, we asked participants about their previous vacation 
choices. Participant #91811 provided the following response: Lake.” As the dependent measures, 
all participants were asked to predict how Participant #91811 had answered the following two 
questions: “How much would you like or dislike taking a trip to a city destination?” and “How 
much would you like or dislike taking a trip to a mountain destination?” Participants predicted 
the target’s response on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = dislike very much to 7 = like very much).  
 
Results and Discussion 
To measure the belief in preference homogeneity, we followed an approach used in out-
group homogeneity literature and computed the standard deviation for each participant’s 
allocation (e.g., Linville et al. 1989); higher “belief scores” represent stronger beliefs in 
preference homogeneity, while lower scores represent weaker beliefs in preference homogeneity. 
(For example, a relatively narrow distribution of [0, 1, 4, 0, 0] would be assigned a belief score 
of 1.73, while a relatively diverse distribution of [0, 1, 1, 1, 2] would be assigned a belief score 
of 0.71.) The maximum possible (and observed) value was 2.24, and the minimum possible (and 
observed) value was 0.00. The mean belief score was 1.06 (SD = 0.51).  
To analyze the data, we used the method proposed by Spiller et al. (2013) to test for 
simple effects in a 2 (within-subjects) by continuous design. We created a contrast score for each 
participant by computing the difference in predicted ratings between the similar option, 
mountain, and the dissimilar option, city (Zcontrast = Ymountain – Ycity). A regression was performed 
using the contrast score as the dependent variable, and belief in preference homogeneity as the 
independent variable. The results indicate a significant simple effect of option (B = 2.20, SE = 
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.29, p < .001), such that participants on average predicted higher ratings for mountain than city. 
The results also indicate a significantly positive slope for the measured variable, belief in 
preference homogeneity (B = .76, SE = .25, p = .002), indicating that the gap between ratings 
increased as beliefs in preference homogeneity strengthened. To further explore this interaction, 
we examined the slopes of predicted ratings for both mountain and city. While the slope of 
mountain ratings was positive but not significant (B = .26, SE = .16, p = .10), the slope of city 
ratings was both negative and significant (B = -.49, SE = .17, p = .005). In other words, people 
who tended to believe others’ tastes are homogeneous were also significantly more likely to infer 
that dissimilar entails dislike.   [INSERT FIGURE 6] 
 Study 5 provides evidence for why people infer dislike from dissimilarity. As our account 
suggests, people default to the belief that others have relatively narrow and homogeneous 
preferences, and thus predict that dissimilar items are disliked. Our results confirm that the 
people who hold this belief most strongly are also the ones who predict the lowest ratings for 
dissimilar options. One possible limitation is that we elicited participants’ preference 
homogeneity beliefs immediately prior to their preference predictions, which could have 
produced unintended spillover effects; however, such a limitation is likely mitigated by the fact 
that participants answered on behalf of two explicitly different targets (i.e., “an average U.S. 
consumer” versus “Participant #91811”) about two different product categories using two 
distinct measures.  
   
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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 Five studies demonstrated that despite liking dissimilar options themselves, people 
routinely predict that others do not. Relying on others’ known choices, people predict that others 
will like similar options and dislike dissimilar ones (Studies 1 and 2). However, comparing 
predicted preferences to actual preferences, the error in this heuristic becomes clear: people 
readily select dissimilar items for themselves (particularly if the dissimilar item is of higher 
quality than a similar one), but fail to predict this choice for others (Studies 3 and 4)—even when 
monetary rewards are at stake (Study 3). Further, we show that the prediction error is driven by 
the misguided belief that others’ preferences are homogeneous (Study 5).  
Our basic paradigm—drawing inferences from someone’s choice—is pervasive in 
everyday life; we routinely acquire information about other people’s decisions and make 
judgments accordingly. Consequently, this prediction error may also be pervasive, leaving us to 
extrapolate more than is warranted by the bits of information we encounter. Further, these 
erroneous inferences happen even for options that are only implicitly (versus explicitly) forgone; 
for example, participants in Studies 1 and 5 knew only that the target had chosen a lake 
vacation—not that the target had chosen the lake vacation over a city vacation—and yet, these 
participants still overwhelmingly inferred that cities were disliked because of their dissimilarity.  
Particularly in contexts like recommendation-making and gift-giving, this bias may 
materially change what people select for someone else: if people are prone to making the wrong 
inferences about dissimilar options—even those options about which they have no explicit 
information—they may miss opportunities to diversify and optimize their recommendations or 
gifts. For instance, might a realtor forgo the opportunity to show a well-priced contemporary 
property after learning of her client’s interest in a traditional home—mistaking a preference for 
the latter as an indication of dislike for the former? Or consider even more consequential 
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contexts: knowing that a terminally ill patient had previously chosen an aggressive and 
experimental curative treatment, might a physician infer that her patient therefore rejects the 
more passive palliative option, and fail to initiate a more comprehensive discussion of all 
possible treatments?  
Beyond actively mispredicting others’ preferences, we suggest this mistaken inference 
has broader interpersonal implications, particularly in situations where it is important to gauge 
others’ intentions. For example, consider what might happen if, in the course of a high-stakes 
negotiation, two dissimilar but equivalently viable options are put forth; would the other party’s 
explicit endorsement of one option signal an implicit rejection of the other—even if that forgone 
option were only slightly less preferred? It is easy to see how this incorrect inference could lead 
to hostile or stalled negotiations. As a final example, one of us had a brief moment of panic when 
a senior colleague pointed out how different it was to collaborate with her versus another of his 
frequent coauthors; she fretted momentarily, assuming that if her colleague liked working with 
one, he could not possibly like working with the other, and worried that she might be the 
dissimilar-and-therefore-disliked collaborator. But, recalling the takeaways of her own research, 
she realized (or at least hoped!) that she was underestimating her colleague’s preferences for a 
diverse array of coauthors. 
As a final thought, we propose that marketers, gift-givers, and recommenders should not 
constrain themselves to exclusively offering or suggesting similar products or options. While 
complex algorithms may steer marketers’ product recommendations in Big Data-enabled settings 
(Linden, Smith and York 2003), there are myriad situations in which people give real-time, face-
to-face, non-analyzed recommendations. Although it may be more difficult to predict which 
dissimilar items will have the most positive reception, there may be valuable upside to “going 
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out on a limb” and suggesting something seemingly different. For example, someone who just 
watched a thriller may be bored by the obvious recommendation for yet another thriller—in 
which case the recommender risks appearing incapable of generating more nuanced and 
customized ideas; perhaps instead offering an acclaimed documentary could both pique 
consumer interest and make the recommender appear savvy and sophisticated. As our studies 
suggest, people are willing to sample diverse options, and in an environment where 
recommendations are routinely and recognizably based on item-to-item similarity, firms and 
individuals may risk appearing trite or unoriginal—or worse, like they have failed to recognize 
the variety of their clients’ tastes. In this case, understanding that dissimilarity does not entail 
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Figure 2: Study 1 Percent of participants predicting each preference for Mountain and City 













































Figure 3: Study 2 Percent of participants predicting each preference for Widget B (Clustered bars 























































Figure 5: Study 4 Percent of participants choosing the higher rated alternative genre 
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